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Abstract. Physical signature verification on absentee ballots became a
major flashpoint in the 2018 midterm elections in the United States, es-
pecially in states like Georgia, Florida, and Arizona, where close election
margins resulted in heightened attention to the counting of absentee bal-
lots. As vote-by-mail solutions are becoming more prevalent across the
U.S., these issues are sure to continue affecting elections in the United
States. Signature verification is an inexact science; often times guidelines
can vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In this paper we pro-
vide a cryptographic remedy to this solution that is usable, secure, and
easily integrated into existing election infrastructure.
1 Introduction
The 2018 midterm elections in the United States saw numerous contentious races
come down to the wire as jurisdictions counted and recounted ballots. One of
the biggest pressure points was that of absentee ballots: in many states, there
was intense litigation over which absentee ballots could be counted in the totals.
Georgia saw a federal court overrule the policies in Gwinnett County, where
ballots from Asian-American voters were being rejected at significantly higher
rates than other voters [13]. Other states like Florida and Arizona saw similar
issues [33,26]
Much of the litigation around absentee ballots focused on signatures: in the
United States, absentee ballots require the voter to sign their name to the ballot
to provide authentication and legally swear that they are not committing fraud.
An example envelope is shown in Figure 1. This issue is sure to be compounded
by the rise of vote-by-mail in the U.S.: in 2018 three U.S. states cast ballots
almost entirely absentee, and numerous other states permit no-reason absen-
tee voting, with the number increasing each election cycle as more states pass
election reforms [4].
Signature validation is often done by hand [25], though there are automated
solutions available [2]. Both schemes have inherent flaws, as human-generated
signatures change over time and often are not consistently reproduced by the
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Fig. 1: Absentee Ballot Envelope from Washington County, Oregon—
An example of the envelope a voter signs when mailing in their ballot [5].
signee.1 They can also be omitted entirely, by mistake. Some difficulties are well
documented in election worker training manuals, such as [3] from Colorado. Local
regulations and election worker training may change between jurisdictions, so
absentee ballot rejection rates based on signature validation can vary by several
percentage points even within one state [29]. All of these factors contribute to a
need for a more robust method of voter authentication for absentee ballots.
In this paper, we present an application of cryptography to solve this problem.
Local governments can establish a shared secret with voters through processes
which are already in place (voter registration), with little additional cost. Voters
can then use this shared secret to derive a cryptographic signature code for their
ballot, which they will write on the envelope in place of a handwritten signature
bearing the voter’s name.
Using signature codes like 14- or 20-digit numbers is a vast improvement
over handwritten name-signatures, as there is less room for interpretation of a
voter’s handwriting. Techniques like OCR can be more effectively applied to this
approach, as the form of the signature is no longer important, only its content.
Asking voters to write down long numbers may not be an acceptably usable
approach. We propose some mitigations to this process, and argue that writing
signatures codes in this way is not inherently less usable than the current stan-
dard. Handwritten name-signatures can also always be used as a backup, in case
the technology fails or a voter has difficulty using the approach.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the current vote-by-mail landscape and the role signatures play, as well as
providing a threat model. Section 3 develops our approach and addresses some of
the nuance therein. Finally, Section 4 contextualizes the solution and concludes.
2 Background
2.1 How absentee voting works
Absentee ballots in the United States function in one of two ways. Some states,
like Colorado, Washington, and Oregon, send ballots to all registered voters a
1 The field of forensics has numerous studies about the failure of trained experts
and automated systems to correctly identify correct or forged signatures, for exam-
ple [28,15,8,18].
few weeks prior to the election. Other states, like Michigan, Texas, and Georgia,
require voters to explicitly request absentee ballots. Ballots are sent via the
postal service, and voters have up until some deadline to fill them out and mail
them back to their election office.
A typical absentee ballot voting process involves filling out the ballot, placing
the ballot in an inner secrecy envelope, and then putting the secrecy envelope
with the ballot inside an outer envelope. The voter then signs the outer envelope
and mails the ballot back to their clerk.
2.2 Threat Model
Postal voting in this way has four main potential adversaries:
1. Coercers—coercers are often people the voter knows, e.g. a spouse or boss.
They can cause (either by force or by enticement) the voter to surrender
her ballot and either vote in the voter’s place, or simply disenfranchise the
voter. Coercers may forge the voter’s signature or compel the voter to sign.
Signature validation may detect this kind of attack, if the coercers do not
produce faithful forgeries [32,24].
2. Impersonators–these voters order ballots on behalf of people who don’t
vote frequently (or who are no longer eligible to vote but have not been
removed from the voter rolls. There is little to no evidence that this type of
election fraud occurs in the U.S. [14].
3. Insiders—insiders run the elections. They can potentially reject ballots or
change the votes on a ballot, assuming there are not strong policies in force
to prevent this. This kind of issue has been raised by litigation about “exact
match,” where election officials use very strict rules when evaluating voter
information and signatures [23].
4. Nation-states—nation-states can prevent ballots from being delivered to
the voter by sending a flurry of fake absentee requests for the wrong address,
or by meddling in voter registration data. We have already seen intrusion
into voter registration systems in the United States [34]. They may also be
able to tamper with tabulation of the ballots, but this is outside our scope.
It is worth pointing out that the current signature validation scheme used
in much of the U.S. provides no mitigation to any of these threats. There are
other procedural security measures that can prevent, say, insiders from throwing
out ballots or nation-states from overwhelming the postal system, but we shall
consider them outside of scope.
3 Implementation
In this section we discuss our scheme for absentee voter authentication and some
of the implementation details. A step-by-step procedure is provided in Figure 2.
3.1 The Scheme
The first critical components to our scheme is a shared secret established between
the local or state elections office and the voter. This secret can be established at
the time of registration or after the fact, and may be derived from information
Establishing a shared secret
1. Voter registers to vote, as usual.
2. The voter registration system derives a shared secret in some way, e.g. by
generating a nonce or hashing the voter’s data.
3. The shared secret is sent to the voter, via a voter information page, physical
mail, a hardware token, etc.
Voting
1. The voter recieves her ballot in the mail and votes it.
2. The voter generates a signature code via the voter information page, a phone
app, a hardware token, or other means. The code may be, for example, a hash
of the last code (the first code would be a hash of the shared secret).
3. The voter writes the code on her ballot in place of a name-signature.
4. The voter mails her ballot back to the elections office.
Validation
1. Upon receiving the voters ballot, the elections office generates the signature
code using the same procedure as the voter.
2. The elections office code is compared to the code written on the envelop.
– If the codes match, the ballot will be counted.
– Otherwise, the ballot may be ignored. The voter may be notified that their
vote will not be counted.
Fig. 2: Step-by-step procedure for implementing signature codes
about the voter’s data as well as a source of randomness. Details about this
shared secret and its derivation are further discussed in Section 3.2.
The other component in our scheme is a signature code generator, which takes
the voter’s shared secret as input and produces a unique identifier that can only
be generated by the voter and the elections office. Details of this generator are
further discussed in Section 3.3.
Once the voter has voted their ballot and sealed it within the envelope, they
use the generator and their shared secret to generate a value, and write it on
the envelope. Once the election office receives the envelope, they use the same
information to derive the signature code and count the ballot if it matches.
Otherwise, they reject.2
3.2 The Shared Secret
Driver’s license numbers are frequently used as authentication tokens by voter
registration systems (e.g. in Washington, Michigan, Georgia, etc.). However,
driver’s license numbers in some states are derived in a deterministic fashion.
This means that anyone with basic information about the voter (name, date
of birth, home address, etc.) can derive the voter’s driver’s license number and
potentially change the voter’s registration data. Utilities to do this sort of thing
already exist on the web [12].
2 We omit solutions for “curing” invalid signature codes, as they are frequently highly
constrained by local regulation and outside our scope.
Another authentication token used by existing voter registration systems
is the last four digits of a social security number, a national identifier used
for administrative purposes and authentication by numerous entities within the
United States. These numbers are also deterministic, and do not alone make
a good token for authentication. Worse, these data regularly leak due to data
breaches [22], and moreover most voter data is already publicly available [19].
Jurisdictions should thus use some other form of data to derive the shared
secret with the voter. One option would be a hash of the voter’s existing voter
information data and a random nonce securely generated by the voter registra-
tion system. Voters can then regenerate the secret as needed, and the secret
can be updated on a per-election basis and when the voter updates his or her
information. If the voter discloses her secret in any manner, the situation can be
remedied by generating another secret.
It is likely desirable for the secret generation process to be controlled by the
election office, as an attacker with the voter’s registration information may be
able to generate their own shared secret and impersonate the voter. This attack
is already present in the current signature validation model as an attacker could
forge the voter’s signature or coerce the voter into signing a ballot they control, so
we consider this attack out of scope. Another consideration is that the transport
mechanism of the shared secret, once generated, must be protected, otherwise
an attacker could simply sniff the secret and impersonate the voter.
3.3 Generating a signature code
Signatures can be generated in myriad ways. A pseudo-random number generator
can be used, with the shared secret as a seed. Alternatively, a hash of the secret
can be used.
Of course, if the shared secret is established as a traditional cryptographic
key, say, an RSA key, then the signature code can also be a cryptographic sig-
nature signed over some pre-established information (e.g. the voter’s name, the
date of the election, or in electronic voting schemes, the content of the ballot).
The generation of signature codes can be done online or offline, and we en-
courage the process to be done in a transparent manner. For most voters, it is
probably sufficient to embed signature codes onto voter information websites, or
distribute codes via other mechanisms like a phone app or text message. Some
voters, like those overseas or in the military, may not have sufficient access to
derive codes in this way. To handle this, alternative applications may be feasible,
like hardware tokens with the shared secret and generator function embedded in
them. In the United States, the military has some infrastructure to support this
already, like the Common Access Card [1].
3.4 A realistic implementation
A likely implementation of our scheme is that the voter and election office agree
upon a shared secret during registration, and that the voter registration system
provides the functionality to generate signatures code for the voter. This can be
done with just a hash function: provided the voter authenticates herself to the
voter registration system, each signature code can be just a hash of the shared
secret and a nonce or timestamp, or a hash chain of past signature codes.
Fig. 3: Voter information card from Walton County, Florida—a sample
voter information card, which is sent to voters with their precinct and ballot
style information after registering to vote and before each election. This card
can serve as the mechanism for distributing the shared secret (and in fact the
voter ID might be usable as the secret). Taken from [6].
This implementation solves the problem of faulty signature code validation,
and it does not subject voters to more risk from bad actors than the current
handwritten name signature system. Further, if the system is implemented such
that the voter can increment the code at will, this may provide some weak
protection against a coercer. E.g., if a voter has her ballot submitted by a coercer,
she can increment the signature code such that when the elections office receives
her ballot, it will be canceled due to an expired signature code. This is not unlike
the alarm code approach hinted at in [7], and approaches like Civitas [11] and
Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [20].
This approach does not prevent against nation-state attacks or insider threats,
however it can mitigate coercion and impersonation, which is an improvement
over the current signature-based system.
This implementation is conceptually simple and easy to implement from an
engineering perspective. Most U.S. states already have online voter information
portals (for instance, see Figure 4), and adding a hash output to the voter infor-
mation page would be a fairly simple task. Further, states already communicate
out-of-band with voters, sending voter registration cards through the mail (an
example can be seen in Figure 3. The shared secret could be generated and
printed on the card. Ultimately, this solution is cheap and simple.
4 Discussion
In this section we discuss some properties of our scheme, suggest where it can
be applied, and discuss some future work.
As a brief aside, this system prevents malicious or intentional disenfran-
chisement of voters due to strict pattern matching during the voter registration
process. If strict matching is used, this scheme can provide additional assurance,
or act as an alarm of sorts, that a mismatch was unintentional and warrants
further investigation by an election official
Fig. 4: Michigan Voter Information Page—signature codes can be generated
via a voter page like this one.
4.1 Related Work
Internet voting systems like the in Estonia [31,30] and the experiments in Nor-
way [16,27,17] may benefit from this scheme. Notably, Estonia already provisions
a key pair for its citizens in its national ID, and this key pair might provide
stronger properties to our scheme.
Other end-to-end voting systems, like those described in Bernhard et al. [7]
may also benefit from a more robust voter authentication protocol. Remotegrity [35]
was an adaptation of the Scantegrity II voting system to a mail ballot and online
voting system.
4.2 Usability
Once generated, the voter still has to correctly transcribe the signature code onto
the ballot envelope. This may present a usability issue: human transcription of
many-digit numbers is not well studied.3. If this does present an issue, other
kinds of signature codes may be generated. Following after some of the usable
password work [9], signatures codes may be random sentences constructed based
on the output of the signature code function. This provides a neat property:
even if the voter makes a mistake, it is unlikely that the mistake will make their
signature code unverifiable: a typo in one word of a sentence does not obscure
the content of teh sentence.
Further work is needed to establish what impact our scheme has on the
usability of absentee voting. Better understanding how accurate humans are
at transcribing numbers is paramount to making our scheme work. Moreover,
requiring voters to perform an additional step in the process voting may have
negative affects on voters’ ability to vote successfully, and this also needs further
study.
3 [21] provides some discussion of handwriting recognition, that’s somewhat unrelated.
There has also been some work on CAPTCHAs, which is a similar task [10]
4.3 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a remedy to the problem of absentee ballot signature
validation. Signature validation will only become a more pressing problem as
absentee voting expands in the United States and elsewhere. This paper is a
first step towards solving voter authentication for remote voting, and we hope
that future work will illuminate better mechanisms to solve this problem.
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